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SUMMARY 
Water is certainly an important factor in China's food security. Some authors have 
argued that up to 70% of the country's grain production depends on irrigation. Since 
the water resources for agriculture in northern China are getting increasingly exhausted 
and diverted to urban and industrial consumption, they have published grim predictions 
of food shortages. The following analysis uses a detailed agro-climatic model to estimate 
China's maximum grain production potential under rain-fed and irrigated conditions. 
It shows that far less than 70% of China's grain production critically depends on 
irrigation. Large areas in the south and some areas in the north-east can produce 
substantial amounts of grain using only natural precipitation. According to our model, 
some 492 million tons of grain can be produced at current technology without additional 
irrigation. However, depending on diet, this may still not be enough for China's grain 
demand in 2025, which was estimated at up to 650 million tons. Only with additional 
irrigation would China be able to produce these amounts of grain. According to our 
model, the country has a grain production potential of some 672 million tons, if 
irrigation is available in those areas, that do not have enough precipitation for rain-fed 
cultivation. Water conservation in irrigation and the development of water resources for 
agriculture is therefore critical for China's food security. 
INTRODUCTION 
There can be no doubt that water is an important 
issue in China's development process. All major 
sectors will have increasing demands: industry, 
the service sector, residential areas, and certainly 
agriculture. However, before we analyze the spe-
cific problems of water use in China's agriculture, 
one observation should be emphasized: in its 
long history, this civilization had been confronted 
with water shortages for centuries. Hence, the 
Chinese developed one of the most sophisticated 
systems of irrigation long ago. Already during the 
early Han Dynasty, in the fourth and third cen-
tury BC, they started systematic land reclamation 
and irrigation schemes, converting large areas of 
natural land into rice paddies (Fang and Xie, 
1994). The process, which was systematically 
planned and coordinated by subsequent dynastic 
bureaucracies, reached a first climax in the elev-
en th and twelfth centuries (Braudel, 1990). While 
past success in water management is certainly no 
guarantee for the future, it still suggests a deep 
cultural experience with this resource. This accu-
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mulated knowledge in large groups of China's 
(agricultural) population - transformed into in-
stitutions and traditions - is a good starting point 
to master the challenges of the future. There is 
no need for nervous pessimism or blunt dooms-
day scenarios. 
What are the core problems? 
While various authors have emphasized different 
aspects of China's water problems, most experts 
would probably agree that each analysis must 
take into account at least the following 
dimensions: 
( 1) The highly uneven spatial distribution of 
China's freshwater resources. 
( 2) The strong seasonality in precipitation and 
- consequently- river flows. 
(3) The increasing discharge of untreated 
wastewater from industry and urban areas. 
( 4) The insufficient capacity of urban water 
supply systems as compared to the rapidly 
increasing demand. 
( 5) The low efficiency of traditional irrigation 
systems based on open canals and field 
flooding, if compared with high-tech 
irrigation schemes. 
(6) The lack of adequate pricing mechanisms 
that would signal scarcity to the water 
consumers. 
(7) The institutional and political frictions 
between various administrative levels, 
concerning planning, financing, 
construction and maintenance of water-
related infrastructure. 
(8) The conflicts between different types of 
water use, such as hydropower generation, 
freshwater supply, extraction and 
discharge of industrial process water, 
irrigation in agriculture, fishery and river 
transport. 
These water problems have already led to a 
number of secondary effects that clearly are a 
reason of great concern: 
• Large amounts of groundwater extraction 
(particularly for irrigation and municipal 
use in the northern part of the North 
China plain) have caused the ground-
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water table to fall and might lead to an 
aridification of the topsoil. 
• There is serious ecosystem deterioration 
in those watersheds and coastal areas, 
where industrial pollution has been 
increasing rapidly in recent years. This 
affects not only the biodiversity in these 
areas, but threatens the fishing and/ or 
tourist industry and the farmers who need 
irrigation water downstream. 
• The construction of dams and reservoirs 
for irrigation, municipal use, and industry 
and for hydropower generation is affected 
by very serious siltation problems -
particularly along the Middle Reach of the 
Yellow River. Reservoir siltation not only 
reduces the storage capacity (and thus the 
amount of possible water withdrawal), but 
also affects turbines and other power-
generating equipment. And it clogs up 
irrigation infrastructure (Brismar, 1998). 
• Dams and dykes in China, which are 
essential for the water infrastructure, are 
frequently in poor condition. Up to one 
third of all dams are potentially dangerous 
and need better maintenance. On March 
23, 1999 China Daily reported that almost 
33 000 smaller and medium-sized dams 
would need repairs, which would require 
an investment of about US$3.6 billion. A 
deteriorating water infrastructure has 
seriously increased the risk of flooding in 
China (which is already quite high from 
natural causes). Natural conditions, such 
as the sil ta ti on of the Yellow River, amplify 
these problems: there is an ongoing battle 
to increase the height of the dams, as the 
Yellow River is constantly raising its bed by 
sediment deposition (in some places it is 
some 8 m above the surrounding area). 
There are, of course, many other specific 
consequences of water problems in the country, 
but now we would like to focus on the situation in 
agriculture. 
ANALYSIS OF WATER PROBLEMS IN 
AGRICULTURE 
Climate factors, particularly precipitation, are 
critical for China's agriculture. Rainfall is very 
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Map 1 Average annual precipitation in China, 1958-1988 (selected precipitation ranges) 
Primary data sources: Leemans and Cramer (1991) ; IIASA database for mean monthly values of temperature, precipitation and 
cloudiness on a global terrestrial grid, IIASA Report, RR-91-18, Laxenburg, 63 pp.; Inst. of Soil Science, Academia Sinica (1986). The 
Soil Atlas of China, Cartographic Publishing House, Beijing, p . 6 
Map Projection Details: Projection: 1AMBERT_AZIMU11IAL, Datum: NONE, Units: METERS, Spheroid: DEFINED, Major Axis: 
6370997.00000, Minor Axis: 0.00000; Parameters: radius of the sphere of reference: 6370997.00000, longitude of centre of 
projection: 105 0 0.00, latitude of center of projection: 44 0 0.000, false easting (meters) : 0.00000, false northing (meters) : 0.00000 
unevenly distributed within the country: there 
is more than enough in the southeast and almost 
none in the West. The Xi Jiang (Pearl River) 
basin and delta have the highest precipitation 
levels in mainland China with more than 2000 
mm per year. Very high precipitation can be 
also found in Guangdong province (see Map 
1). From high precipitation in the coastal 
provinces of the southeast, rainfall gradually 
declines toward the northwest. An area of 
moderate precipitation stretches from Yunnan 
in the south through the North China plain to 
the northeastern province ofHeilongjiang. Most 
ofXinjiang and Gansu provinces and most parts 
of Inner Mongolia, Tibet, and Qinghai in the 
centre are extremely dry. Average precipitation 
in these provinces is below 200 mm per year; 
some areas have almost no rainfall . A critical 
level of precipitation is around 400 mm per 
year; below that level , rain-fed agriculture is 
usually very difficult or impossible. The orange 
and yellow areas in Map 2 show that 
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Map 2 Share of irrigated land in China's cultivated areas 
Map developed by IIASA LUC Project. Primary Data Sources: (1) State Land Administration of the People's Republic of China/ 
United Nations Development Program/ State Science and Technology Commission of the People's Republic of China/ Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations: Land Resources - Use and Productivity Assessment in China. Project CPR/87 / 029, 
Beijing (1994). (2) Institute for Remote Sensing Applications: Land-cover map of China. Beijing (1994) 
precipitation in much of China's land areas is 
below that critical level. 
Settlement patterns in China reflect these 
greatly varying precipitation levels. In Table 1 we 
have analyzed how many people live in areas with 
insufficient precipitation. In the three decades 
between 1958 and 1988, some 3.97 billion ha in 
China (or 42% of the total area) had average 
precipitation below 400 mm; but only 38 million 
people (or 3.3% of the 1992 population) were 
living in these areas with very low precipitation. 
Thus, the great majority of the Chinese 
population has settled in regions, where 
precipitation is, in principle, sufficient for rain-
fed agriculture. Actually, about 51 % of China's 
population of 1992 ( 589 million people) lives in 
areas where average precipitation is quite high -
about 1000 mm per year or above (corresponding 
to some 22% of the total land) . The population 
density in these areas is 280 people per square 
kilometer (see Map 1 and Table 1). This 
fundamental relationship between precipitation 
patterns and population distribution suggests 
that seasonal surplus of water (in the form of 
flooding) is likely to affect many more people in 
China than a lack of water. This is reflected in 
statistical data which, for most years in recent 
history, indicate that more arable land areas and 
more people are affected by flooding than by 
drought (see Figure 1). 
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Table I Population and land area in China by precipitation zones 
Precipitation 
(average for 
1958-1988) Area Area Population Population Population 
(mm) (sq km) (%of total) (millions) (%of total) density 
2000-4000 36 350 0.4 12 1.0 324 
1000-2000 2 064 700 21.9 577 49.8 280 
800-1000 544 000 5.8 148 12.8 272 
600-800 986 075 10.4 214 18.5 217 
400-600 1 845 250 19.5 170 14.7 92 
200-400 l 229 225 13.0 24 2.1 20 
< 200 2 742 900 29.0 14 l.2 5 
Source: IIASA LUC-GJS 
The Table should be read as follows: about 50% of the Chinese population of 1992 (or 589 million) lived in some 22% of the total land 
area, in which average annual precipitation between 1958 and 1988 was between 1000 and 2000 mm per year (in some small areas it 
was even up to 4000 mm). The population density in these areas was between 280 and 324 people per sq km 
From the Table, we can also see that roughly 82% of the population lives in areas, where average precipitation over the three decades 
between 1958 and 1988 was 600 mm per year or more. This precipitation level is usually sufficient for rain-fed agriculture (provided 
that the timing of the rain is adequate for cultivation or that water storage systems are in place for buffering seasonal variation) 
If we consider precipitation levels of more than 400 mm as still adequate for some kind of rain-fed agriculture (with a low level of 
productivity), we find that almost 97% of the Chinese population live in these areas. While there are some places in the world where 
agriculture is successfully practiced at such low precipitation leve ls, it is clear that the range between 400 and 600 mm is difficult for 
cultivation 
To be on the safe side, we can say that roughly 5-10% of the Chinese population lives in areas where precipitation leve ls are so low that 
rain-fed agriculture is marginal or impossible. This first crude estimate is confirmed by our more detailed LGP estimates in the AEZ 
model (which take into count several other climate factors, such as minimum and maximum temperature, sunshine duration, frost-
free days, wind speed, etc.) 
LESTER BROWN'S ALARMING 
DIAGNOSIS OF WATER SHORTAGES 
IN CIBNA'S AGRICULTURE 
The above conclusion might surprise those who 
have read Lester Brown's alarming diagnosis of 
China's water shortage. He argued that: 
'China depends on irrigated land to produce 
70% of the grain for its huge population of 1.2 
billion people. But it is drawing more and 
more of that water to supply the needs of its 
fast growing cities and industries (p. 10) . While 
four-fifths of the water is in the south, two-
thirds of the cropland is in the north. As a 
result, the water per hectare of cropland in the 
north is only one-eighth that in the south (p. 
12) ... in a country, where 70 percent of an 
even larger grain harvest [than in the US] 
comes from irrigated land, and where 
groundwater mining is widespread, the 
impending consequences of aquifer depletion 
are far greater'. (Brown and Halweil, 1998, 
p. 18) 
These arguments suggest that China's water 
problems - which no one familiar with the 
situation would deny - actually affect the bulk of 
China's grain production. We cannot confirm 
this with our data. 
First, our sources indicate that much less of the 
cultivated land is in the water-constrained river 
basins of the north. In 1997, the United Nations 
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and 
the Pacific (ESCAP) commissioned a large study 
on China's freshwater resources. It was conducted 
in collaboration with the Nanjing Institute of 
Hydrology and Water Resources of the Ministry 
of Water Resources of China. The main results, 
reproduced in Table 2, indicate that all river 
basins in the south, southeast and southwest have 
more than enough water. The per capita surface 
water runoff ranges from 2400 to 32 000 cubic 
meters. The annual water resources per hectare 
of cultivated land range from 39 300 to 327 000 
cubic meters, which is certainly enough by all 
measures. The problem should also be less serious 
in the northeast, where almost 1480 cubic meters 
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Figure 1 Areas affected by natural disasters by province, 1996 ( 1000 ha) . 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 1997, State Statistical Bureau, People's Republic of China, Beijing, China, p . 397. Note: For 
Tianjin and Shanghai, only total area affected by disasters was available. For Fujian and Hainan, only total disaster area and area 
affected by droughts were available. For Tibet, only total disaster area and area affected by floods were available 
are available per person per year and 9560 cubic 
meters per hectare of cultivated land. 
The situation is certainly different in the rain-
f ed cultivation areas in the middle and northern 
parts of the North China plain, especially near 
the urban agglomeration of Beijing and Tianjin, 
where farmers pump water from the groundwater 
table. There are also problems with those 
irrigation systems that are fed by the water-scarce 
rivers of the north, such as the Yellow River. 
However, these problems of water scarcity in the 
north and northwest must be sharply 
distinguished from the situation in the humid 
south and southeast. In the northern part of the 
North China plain , strong competition has 
emerged between the water consumption of 
industry and urban areas, on the one hand, and 
the irrigated cultivation, on the other hand. 
Here are serious water resource deficits, but they 
clearly affect only part of China's agricultural 
production. 
According to the ESCAP re port, the situation 
is certainly serious in the Hai He-Luan He Basin, 
which covers about 11 % of China's cultivated 
area and is home to some 10% of the population. 
Very limited surface water runoff is also reported 
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Table 2 Surtace water runoff and availability in China, 1993 (% of national total) 
Water resources 
Per capita water per ha 
Water Cultivated resources cultivated land 
River resources Population land (cubic meter per (cubic meter per 
System Region (%) (%) (%) year per person) year per ha) 
Northeastern 6.9 10.0 19.8 1479 9560 
II Hai He-Luan He Basin 1.5 10.0 10.9 225 3760 
III Huai He Basin 3.4 16.0 14.9 389 6310 
IV Huang He Basin 2.6 8.0 12.7 656 5730 
II+III+IV 7.5 34.0 38.5 
v Changjiang Basin 34.2 34.0 24.0 2369 39 300 
VI Southern 16.8 12.0 6.8 3465 67 950 
VII Southeastern 9.2 6.0 3.2 2999 73 800 
VIII Southwestern 20.8 2.0 1.7 31 679 327 000 
V + VI + VII + VIII 81.0 54.0 35.7 
IX Interior basins 4.6 2.0 5.8 4832 21 850 
National total 100 100 100 2323 28 000 
Source: United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) (1997): Study on Assessment of Water 
Resources of Member Countries and Demand by User Sectors: China - Water Resources and Their Use, New York, p. 9 
Note: The water resources per ha cultivated land are calculated with the 'old' estimate of96 million ha 
for the Huai He and the Huang He basin. 
Together, these three northern and eastern basins 
account for 38.5% of the cultivated land and are 
home to some 34% of the population. However, 
while there are serious problems in these areas, 
one cannot say that the compwte crop production 
in these regions is threatened by water scarcity. 
The yields might be much lower than they could 
be, but some grain is certainly produced. 
Second, the discrepancy to Brown's conclusions 
is even greater when we consider crop production. 
In the south, Chinese farmers can frequently 
harvest 2 to 3 times per year at high yields. In 
addition to rice during the monsoon season, they 
can also grow winter wheat in some areas. 
To obtain a better understanding of what 
percentage of crop production (not just the area) 
is actually affected by water constraints, the IIASA 
Land Use Change Project has conducted a 
detailed assessment of China's agro-climatic and 
biophysical conditions for rain-fed versus irrigated 
agriculture. The key questions were : (a) What is 
China's grain cultivation potential under purely 
rain-fed conditions? (b) What is the grain 
cultivation potential of the country when irrigation 
would (and could) be used in addition to natural 
rainfall? ( c) In which regions of the country would 
irrigation produce the highest increase in the grain 
production potential? 
MODELLING CHINA'S RAIN-FED AND 
IRRIGATED CROP PRODUCTION 
POTENTIAL: THE AGRO-
ECOLOGICAL ZONES (AEZ) 
METHODOLOGY 
To understand the basic idea of the AEZ 
approach let us imagine a hypothetical farmer 
who has the task to evaluate the suitability of a 
particular land area for crop production. He 
would use a whole range of criteria, such as the 
quality of the soil, the local climate conditions, 
and the possibilities of using different types of 
agricultural input (fertilizers, pesticides, 
machinery). The farmer would also consider 
various kinds of crops because a particular 
area might be very suitable for one crop (for 
instance rice), while only moderately suitable 
for another. 
The AEZ algorithm proceeds in the same way. 
However, the model systematically tests the growth 
requirements of 154 major crop types and subtypes 
(including 83 types of grain) against a very detailed 
set of agro-climatic and soil conditions. For China, 
the model operates on a 5 by 5 kilometer grid; so 
that the total grid matrix has 810 by 970 cells, of 
which some 374 814 grid cells cover the mainland 
of China. Water bodies are automatically 
excluded. In each of these land-related grid cells 
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the AEZ model performs the following (principal) 
steps: 
1. The algorithm first evaluates the climate 
conditions. Obviously, crop cultivation is only 
possible if temperature and precipitation are 
within a certain range. From an agronomic point 
of view, the key concept is the potential 
evapotranspiration. Plants need a constant supply 
of water for their metabolism, in which they lose 
moisture due to evapotranspiration. In rain-fed 
agriculture, the moisture supply to plants depends 
on the precipitation and the waterholding capacity 
of the soil. Some soils (such as Andosols or 
Chernozems) can store water much better than 
others. A given amount of rainfall might be 
sufficient for a particular crop production on a 
soil with high waterholding capacity, while it might 
be insufficient when the soil lets the water seep 
away or evaporate. To take into account these 
principal differences between soils, the AEZ 
algorithm evaluates the climate conditions for 6 
soil classes of waterholding capacity - from 
150 mm to 15 mm, depending on soil 
characteristics and depth. For each soil class, the 
algorithm calculates a soil moisture balance under 
local climate conditions. So far, we have only 
mentioned temperature and precipitation as 
climate parameters, but the AEZ algorithm 
actually uses a more detailed set of climate 
indicators which include (a) monthly 
precipitation, (b) minimum/maximum 
temperature, (c) relative humidity, (d) sunshine 
fraction, and (e) wind speed. For each grid cell 
the algorithm uses these climate parameters to 
calculate a crop-specific potential reference 
evapotranspiration. The algorithm determines 
how much water the various crops would need 
under the climate conditions of a particular grid 
cell. These crop water requirements vary with 
crop type, soil class, and climate conditions. 
2. The algorithm uses the results from step one 
to estimate location-specific potential biomass and 
yields for each crop. For this calculation, the 
program applies a crop model and the length of 
growing period (LGP) concept (see Map 3). The 
algorithm simulates a series of growth cycles on a 
daily basis for each crop - with starting days 
covering a complete 365-day period from January 
to December. In other words, the model tries to 
match crop-specific growth cycles into the LGP of 
Heilig, Fischer and van Velthuizen 
a particular grid cell, which is determined by its 
climate conditions. For each growth cycle the 
algorithm calculates a crop-specific photosynthesis 
response in a two-step procedure: 
(a) First, the thermal conditions of each grid 
cell (temperature profile) are compared 
with the thermal requirements of the crops 
during their growth cycles. For the 
calculation of biomass, the crops are 
grouped into four classes (so called 
adaptability groups) because in some crops 
photosynthesis is more sensitive to changes 
in thermal and radiation conditions than 
in others. Crops are also adapted to 
different temperature ranges. 
(b) Second, the actual moisture supply in the 
particular grid cell is compared with the 
water requirements of the crop. The AEZ 
model essentially calculates - on a day-by-
day basis - a crop-specific soil moisture 
balance. If the water supply is less than the 
water demand of a particular crop, 
empirical yield loss factors are applied 
which reduce the potential biomass yield. 
The water balance also shows the crop-
specific irrigation demand for each grid 
cell. 
The purpose of this two-step procedure is to 
determine the starting date for a growth cycle 
that produces maximum potential yield. Under 
some climate conditions, it is obviously better for 
a particular crop to start cultivation early in the 
year, while under other conditions it might be 
better to wait for a rainy period. This procedure is 
repeated for both rain-fed and irrigated conditions 
and for three levels of agricultural inputs. To 
quantify potential yields, the programme uses 
three characteristics: (a) the so-called maximum 
leaf area index (LAI) which is the ratio of leaf 
area as compared to the crop cultivation area. (b) 
The model also uses the so-called harvest index 
which is the proportion of the primary produce 
(e.g. grain) to total biomass. (c) And the crop 
adaptability group defines the relationship 
between maximum rate of photosynthesis and 
the daytime temperature. The first two measures 
vary with the type of crop and level of input. 
3. So far, the algorithm has dealt with hypothetical 
yields; now the model tries to determine the level 
160 International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology 
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of attainable production per grid cell . For that 
purpose, the model applies three types of 
constraints: 
(a) Agro-climatic constraints: In addition to the 
temperature and moisture factors which 
the model already takes into account in 
step 2, climate-related aspects affecting crop 
management are taken into account: (a) 
workability constraints; and (b) constraints 
due to pests, diseases and weeds. For 
instance, if a particular grid cell has a high 
level of excess moisture (as determined by 
step one) , harvest operations with 
machinery can become difficult, so that a 
high input level cultivation may become 
impossible. On very dry and hard soils, on 
the other hand, ploughing is more difficult 
which also limits the workability. The 
procedure also takes into account that 
humid conditions typically reduce yields 
through higher frequency of pests, crop 
diseases and weeds. 
(b) Agro-edaphic constraints: These deal with soil 
chemical and physical constraints to crop 
production (in addition to the soil 
moisture factors, which the model includes 
in the calculations of step 2) . The AEZ 
model uses an agro-edaphic suitability 
classification (developed by the F AO and 
other organizations) to take into account 
information on soil types, soil texture and 
soil phase. This soil rating scheme defines 
the suitability of each soil unit for each 
individual crop at defined levels of inputs 
and management circumstances. For 
instance, some soils may be very stony, 
others may have chemical problems, which 
will reduce the attainable crop production. 
(c) Terrain constraints: These are limitations of 
crop production due to landform 
characteristics. For instance, soils on steep 
slopes are much harder to cultivate than 
soils in flood plains. They are also more 
susceptible to erosion and, consequently, 
fertility loss. For each grid cell the AEZ 
model takes into account a number of 
these constraints (which are specified by a 
terrain slope suitability classification) to 
further reduce the attainable grain 
production if necessary. 
Heilig, Fischer and van Velthuizen 
4. In the above calculation the algorithm has only 
considered one particular crop per year. Obviously, 
this would be unrealistic in many grid cells because 
multiple crops can often be grown in one season. 
To take into account the possibility for multi-
cropping the AEZ model assigns each grid cell to 
one of 10 cropping zones for both irrigated and 
non-irrigated conditions - from single cropping 
zones (for cryophilic crops) to triple cropping 
zones (for thermophilic crops) . Several climatic 
parameters are used to determine the cropping 
zone for a particular grid cell, such as the LGP, 
the days with minimum temperature above 5° C, 
the accumulated temperature during the growing 
period, and other factors. 
Now everything is prepared for the actual 
selection of an optimal crop for each grid cell (or 
a sequence of up to three optimal crops, in the 
case of multi-cropping). The model has calculated 
the potential yields of all 83 grains under the 
specific climatic, soil and landform conditions of 
a particular grid cell; and the algorithm has 
assigned each grid cell to a cropping zone. Now 
the algorithm only has to select those grains 
among the 83, which maximize production in 
that particular grid cell. In the case of multi-
cropping, the algorithm has to combine up to 
three grains to find the maximum potential yield. 
5. The selection of the 'best' grain for a particular 
grid cell can be described as the task of matching 
the requirements of the grain crop with the 
characteristics of a particular grid cell in such a 
way that maximum grain production can be 
achieved. For this, all crops are grouped into 
classes. Some crops have long growing periods 
(more than 120 days) others have short ones (less 
than 120 days) . Some grains are typically sown 
before the winter (such as winter wheat) , others 
are adapted to hot temperatures. The AEZ 
algorithm uses a scheme of 8 generic crop groups 
to characterise the typical growth requirements 
of the crops and to construct multiple cropping 
patterns. Each crop type belongs to one of these 
eight groups (for details of the selection process 
concerning single and multi-cropping conditions 
see: Fischer et al., 1999) . 
6. With the above calculations the AEZ algorithm 
can now compare the pote ntial yields of the 
selected crop in a particular grid cell with the 
overall maximum potential yield of that crop in 
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all other grid cells of China. For instance, the 
algorithm might find that in a particular grid cell 
the selected wheat has a potential yield of 9 tons 
per ha. This potential yield is now compared with 
the overall maximum yield for wheat in China 
(which might be 10 tons per ha). Now the 
algorithm 'knows' that in this grid cell one can 
potentially produce 9I10 = 90% of the maximum 
yield, which would be equivalent to a grid cell 
that is 'very suitable' for wheat production. In 
other words, the potential yields of the primary 
crop are used to classify each grid cell into one of 
five suitability classes. For each individual grid cell 
the algorithm can thus calculate po ten ti al 
maximal yield estimates by level of input. 
7. However, not all the suitable land can be 
cultivated. Some arable land must be set aside for 
settlements and for water and transportation 
infrastructure. China has a large network of open 
irrigation canals which take up a considerable 
amount of land suitable for cultivation. Some of 
the potentially suitable land is also needed for 
mining and industrial production sites. Finally, 
some land with cultivation potential should not 
be used for agriculture because it is still covered 
by valuable ecosystems, such as natural forests or 
wetlands. In a final step the AEZ methodology, 
therefore, takes into account non-agricultural land 
use within arable areas. First, a digital land-cover 
map is used to determine the size of the inhabited 
land area. The inhabited land area is the total 
land area, minus water bodies and (almost) 
unused land, such as mountains, deserts, forests 
and grassland. This actually usable land is used as 
the denominator for calculating the percentages 
of land areas that are used for settlements, 
infrastructure, and mining (which are taken from 
province-level statistics). Second, this province-
spe cifi c percentage of infrastructure and 
settlements is multiplied by 1.33 to account for 
future urban and infrastructure expansion. Third, 
the potential arable land area from the AEZ model 
is reduced according to this province-specific 
correction factor. This procedure reduces the 
areas that are suitable for crop cultivation by a 
province-specific correction factor for 
infrastructure. 
It must be emphasized that the AEZ estimates do 
not give the actual production, but show what 
production would be possible, if all suitable areas 
Heilig, Fischer and van Velthuizen 
in China (with the exception of infrastructure 
and non-grain crops) could be cultivated at 
currently available levels of technology. The 
estimates are, of course, higher than the current 
production, because not all potentially suitable 
areas are currently used, and the productivity has 
not reached its maximal sustainable level 
everywhere (especially in remote inland areas 
where grain yields are still significantly lower). 
(For technical details of the study see: Fischer et 
al., 1999). 
RESULTS 
China's rain-fed versus irrigated grain 
cultivation potential 
According to our AEZ model, China has a total 
rain-fed cultivation potential of 147 million 
hectares, which can produce some 492 million 
tons of grain (see Tables 3 and 4). This takes 
into account all areas in China with appropriate 
soil, terrain and climate conditions - in both the 
south and the north. The estimate also takes 
into account that some 5 to 15% of the suitable 
land will have to be reserved for infrastructure 
and that 25% of the suitable land will be used 
for non-grain crops, such as vegetables, fruits 
and fibre crops. When we used the same 
methodology to calculate the rain-fed plus 
irrigated cultivation potential of China, we ended 
up with a total of 159 million hectares - which 
would be equivalent to an annual production of 
some 672 million tons of grain (see Tables 5, 6 
and 7). In other words: By using irrigation, China 
can expand its areas with cultivation potential 
from 147 to 159 million hectares or 7.7%. The 
grain production potential can be boosted from 
592 to 672 million tons - or by 36%. The increase 
in production is, of course, higher than in area 
because, with irrigation, the productivity on many 
rain-fed fields in the north and northeast could 
be increased. 
From these analyses, we can conclude that water 
deficits might affect those 36% of China's grain 
production, which are produced on areas that either 
totally depend on irrigation or have significantly 
higherproductivitywhen irrigated. However, that 
also means that some 64 % of the crop production 
is not systematically threatened by water shortages 
- either because it comes from fields in humid 
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Table 3 Potential arable land: mixed input levels, without irrigation (1000 ha) 
High Input Intermediate Input L ow Input 
Province/ 
Region 
North 
Northeast 
East 
Central 
South 
Southwest 
Northwest 
Plateau 
China Total 
Infrastructure 
correction 
fa ctor (%) 
17.7 
13.5 
21.5 
14.8 
10.6 
8.8 
13.2 
8.0 
14.5 
Very 
suitable 
9673 
4808 
5854 
5925 
1705 
809 
166 
60 
29 001 
Suitable 
11 785 
9964 
5609 
5859 
4311 
4248 
1265 
44 
43 086 
Very 
suitable 
313 
320 
294 
6 
5 
54 
277 
1271 
Mod. Very 
Suitable suitable suitable 
4134 8222 
8227 8530 
941 1858 
1354 4859 
1187 4899 
1546 9414 
1430 6155 
66 160 
18 886 44 097 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
152 
0 
152 
Suitable 
189 
181 
6 
8 
67 
99 
203 
11 
764 
TOTAL Arable land (without land areas that are only marginally suitable at low input levels) 
Mod. Marg. 
suitable suitable 
1741 
1503 
191 
610 
1169 
2038 
2539 
101 
9890 
3480 
3128 
1532 
6637 
5627 
7917 
7378 
387 
36 087 
Total 
arable 
land 
Not 
suitable 
39 537 20 298 
36 661 35 447 
16 284 12 162 
25 257 27 090 
18 971 33 453 
26 126 82 788 
19 566 322 809 
830 190 324 
183 234 724 407 
147 147 
Source: IIASA China AEZ Project. Based on methodology described in Fischer et al. ( 1999) : Global AgroEcological Zones Assessment: 
Methodology and Results. IIASA Interim Report, IR-98-110, Laxenburg, Austria 
Table 4 Potential arable land: mixed input levels, with irrigation if necessary (1000 ha) 
High Input Intermediate Input Low Input 
Mod. Very Mod. Marg. Province/ 
Region 
Infrastructure 
conection 
factor(%) 
Very 
suitable Suitable 
Very 
suitable Suitable suitable suitable Suitable suitable suitable 
Total 
arable 
land 
Not 
suitable 
North 
Northeast 
East 
Central 
-South 
Southwest 
Northwest 
Plateau 
China Total 
17.8 
13.5 
21.5 
14.8 
10.6 
11 061 11 372 313 
381 
251 
4021 7863 0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
186 
168 
6 
9 
57 
1729 3317 39 862 19896 
7501 10 388 8008 9181 945 1883 38 454 33 398 
6303 5224 962 1928 190 1511 16375 12040 
5966 6004 7 
5 
43 
226 
1309 4924 603 6544 25 366 26 965 
1673 5023 1002 5115 1108 5143 19 125 33 284 
8.8 
13.2 
8.7 
14.4 
881 4353 1500 9485 99 
202 
11 
738 
2017 7806 26 184 82 724 
3316 4194 1415 6809 144 
0 
144 
2509 7169 25 985 315 400 
64 123 65 197 101 387 949 190 189 
36 764 46 683 1226 18 282 45 505 9201 33760 192 303 713 931 
TOTAL Arable land (without land areas that are only marginally suitable at low input levels) 158 543 
Source: lIASA China AEZ Project. Based on methodology described in Fischer et al. ( 1999): Global AgroEcological Zones Assessment: 
Methodology and Results. IIASA Inte rim Report, IR-98-110, Laxenburg, Austria 
regions (where there is certainly enough water), 
or because precipitation is still sufficient for 
(some) rain-fed production . 
Of course, our analysis does not imply that this 
potential production could be achieved every year. 
As anywhere else in the world, in certain years a 
drought may strike. There could even be multi-
year droughts. However , the long-term 
precipitation (and temperature) trends for those 
areas that can produce 64% of China's grain do 
not indicate a systematic water deficit. It would 
not be correct to extrapolate from a few dry years 
the imminent water crisis of China's total 
agriculture. 
One might argue that without irrigation and 
water management even in the humid south, the 
paddy rice fields could not produce their current 
two or three harvests, but only one or two. That is 
correct, but not the point of argument. We argue 
that in a large area in China's south and southeast 
- from the coast to about halfway up between the 
Yangtze and Beijing - water is a management 
issue, not a problem of water scarcity. With proper 
water management, this area has usually enough 
water (from precipitation and surface water 
resources) to produce at least two harvests. One 
has to distinguish th e technical water 
management problems in the southern half of 
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Table 5 Potential grain production: mixed input levels without irrigation (1000 tons) 
High input Intermediate input Low input 
Total Total 
Province Very Very Mod. Very Mod. Marg. potential attainable 
R.egi,on suitable Suitable suitable Suitable suitable suitable Suitable suitable suitable production production 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (I - 9) (1 - 8) 
North 47122 46 248 1824 9257 14 969 0 211 1266 1594 122 491 120 897 
Northeast 22 047 32 353 1039 18 351 12 021 0 149 784 1162 87 906 86 744 
East 61 162 39 784 1731 3878 5933 12 272 1697 114470 112 773 
Central 55 637 49 162 32 5945 18 366 0 15 981 7601 137 738 130 137 
South 20 758 46634 24 7150 23 144 0 95 1147 6886 105 839 98 953 
Southwest 7400 35 045 188 5831 31 355 0 124 2050 8070 90 063 81 993 
Northwest 590 4303 672 4328 II 329 232 226 1865 3154 26 698 23 544 
Plateau 495 303 5 218 383 0 14 94 198 1709 1511 
China Total 215 219 253 841 5515 54960 117 503 232 847 8458 30 361 686 936 656 575 
Total production 161 414 190 381 4136 41220 88 127 174 635 6344 22 771 515 202 492 431 
(with correction 
for other crops) 
Source: IIASA China AEZ Project. Based on methodology described in Fischer el al. ( 1999): Global Agro Ecological Zones Assessment: 
Methodology and Results. IIASA Interim Report, IR-98-110, Laxenburg, Austria 
Table 6 Potential grain production according to IIASAFAO AEZ model: Scenario 3: mixed input levels, with 
irrigation if necessary (1000 tons) 
High input Intermediate input Low input 
Total Total 
Province Very Very Mod. Very Mod. Marg. potential attainable 
R.egi,on suitable Suitable suitable Suitable suitable suitable Suitable suitable suitable production production 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (I - 9) (I - 8) 
North 111 588 85 710 1942 9412 15 056 0 210 1268 1526 226 713 225 187 
Northeast 46100 43189 1640 18 277 14 028 0 137 557 770 124 697 123 927 
East 81 137 51 435 1563 4277 6409 0 13 271 1651 146 756 145 105 
Central 55 675 51 125 35 6000 18 531 0 18 968 7465 139 816 132 352 
South 27 073 54 843 27 5998 24 569 0 82 1005 6073 119 670 113 598 
Southwest 7945 36 500 160 5721 31686 0 120 2026 7919 92 076 84 158 
Northwest 24890 23 221 1472 4856 13 345 220 225 1849 3074 73 151 70 077 
Plateau 558 621 5 216 438 0 14 93 198 2142 1944 
China Total 354 970 346 658 6843 54759 124 065 220 818 8037 28 674 925 044 896 370 
Total production 266 227 259 994 5132 41 070 93 049 165 614 6027 21 505 693 783 672 278 
(with correction 
for other crops) 
Source: IIASA China AEZ Project. Based on methodology described in Fischer el al. ( 1999): Global Agro Ecological Zones Assessment: 
Methodology and Results . IIASA Interim Report, IR-98-110, Laxenburg, Austria 
the country from the resource scarcity problems 
in the north. 
This can be clearly demonstrated when we 
analyze the regional differences between China's 
rain-fed and irrigated grain production potential. 
Table 7 shows that the biggest advantage of 
irrigation is in the north (including the provinces 
of Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Shanxi, Shandong, 
and Henan) and the northwest (including Inner 
Mongolia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, and 
Xin jiang). If sufficient water was available in these 
regions, irrigation could boost the grain 
production by 104 million tons in the north and 
by 4 7 million tons in the northwest - as compared 
to purely rain-fed cultivation. In percentage terms, 
irrigation makes the biggest difference in the 
northwest: under rain-fed conditions the maximal 
attainable grain production (according to the 
AEZ model) is in the range ofless than 25 million 
tons - with irrigation, this area could produce 
more than 70 million tons of grain (or some 
198% more). Table 7 also indicates some irrigation 
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Table 7 Differences in the maximal attainable grain production between rainfed 
cultivation and cultivation with additional irrigation (where necessary) 
Maximal attainable grain production (in mio tons) 
Without 
irrigation 
North 120 897 
Northeast 86 744 
East 112 773 
Central 130137 
South 98 953 
Southwest 81 993 
Northwest 23 544 
Plateau 1511 
China total 656 575 
(minus 25% for 492 431 
cultivation of 
non-grain crops) 
potential in the northeast (Liaoning, Jilin, 
Heilongjiang): without irrigation, these regions 
can produce a maximum of some 87 million tons 
of grain -with additional irrigation, however, the 
maximal grain production could increase to 124 
million tons. 
What are the major water problems in 
China's agriculture? 
It is clear that the water situation in the north, 
northwest and northeast of China needs careful 
monitoring and decisive measures to increase 
resources. This is necessary to prevent a serious 
decline in agricultural productivity and to stop 
the degradation process that is already under way 
in the natural environment. We believe that there 
are three conditions which we have to take into 
account, in particular, when we analyze the water 
situation in the north: 
• One of the major, rapidly growing 
population centres in China- the Beijing-
Tianjin urban agglomeration - is located 
very close to a climatic border line where 
the long-term precipitation patterns fall 
below the 400 mm threshold - which is a 
critical level for rain-fed agriculture. 
Essentially, all of Beijing's hinterland to 
the west and northwest is more or less 
arid. The soaring water demand of this 
With Difference 
irrigation Difference in% 
225 187 
123 927 
145 105 
132 352 
113 598 
84158 
70 077 
1944 
896 370 
672 278 
104 290 86.3 
37183 42.9 
32 333 28.7 
2214 1.7 
14 645 14.8 
2165 2.6 
46 533 197.6 
433 28.6 
239 795 36.5 
179 847 36.5 
urban agglomeration competes with north-
China' s agriculture in an area of natural 
water scarcity (that is a big difference from 
other big cities in China, such as Wuhan 
or Shanghai). 
• There is a belt of extreme instability in 
precipitation patterns, expanding from 
Ningxia province to the northern part of 
Shaanxi, most of Shanxi, Hebei province 
and the eastern parts of Inner Mongolia. 
As can be seen from Map 3 this is clearly 
reflected in the LGP, which we have 
calculated for the period between 1958 
and 1988. They strongly fluctuate from 
year to year in these regions - indicating 
that climatic production conditions are 
very unstable (other than, for instance in 
Sichuan province, which is an 'island of 
agro-climatic stability'). 
• Siltation is the major problem in the Yellow 
River basin, which has a multitude of 
consequences. In its upper and middle 
reaches the sediment load of the river is 
filling up the water reservoirs thus reducing 
their storage capacity, ruining the turbines 
and clogging irrigation pipes and canals. 
It was estimated that between 1949 and 
1975 the reservoirs in the provinces of 
Shaanxi, Shanxi, Gansu, and Inner 
Mongolia lost 1.15 % of their total capacity 
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each year due to siltation (Wang, 1998). 
The declining capacity reduces their buffer 
function against the extreme seasonality 
of water flow in the Yellow River - which, 
in turn, increases the risk of flooding 
downstream (and reduces their 
hydropower potential). The alternative is 
not much better: with larger reservoir 
capacity upstream, the water flow 
downstream would slow down - giving the 
sediment load that is picked up 
subsequently an even better chance to 
settle on the bottom (which, in turn, 
increases the risk of flooding again). There 
is no easy solution for the Yellow River. 
With these conditions, water is certainly a major 
problem in north China's agriculture. However, 
there are many technical, economic and 
administrative possibilities to deal with these 
problems. Some of them will be discussed below. 
The most obvious measure to cope with China's 
water problem is, of course, to develop existing 
water resources and improve the institutional 
structure of the water sector. Since its foundation, 
and particularly since the 1980s, China has 
initiated a large number of water projects. These 
include the massive Three Gorges Project on the 
Yangtze River, the Xiaolangdi Multi-Purpose Dam 
Project on the Yellow River, the Huai He River 
Cleaning project, the Taihu Lake Harnessing and 
the preparation for the South-to-North Water 
Transfer Project. In 1988, a new water law of the 
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People's Republic of China concentrated the 
responsibility for the water sector in the Ministry 
of Water Resources. It primarily oversees (a) the 
implementation of a rational water assets 
operation and management systems; (b) 
introduction of effective pricing mechanisms; (c) 
the legal and regulatory structures; (d) water 
quality and water services; and ( e) the construction 
of reservoirs, dams and embankments. Since the 
early 1950s, China has built about 85 000 reservoirs 
with a total storage capacity of 4 79. 7 billion cubic 
meters and 2953 large and medium-sized dams 
with storage of 417 billion cubic meters. China 
has regulated almost all the medium and small 
rivers, with 247000 km of embankmentand 31 000 
water gates. Despite these impressive measures, 
much remains to be done. Some of the dams, 
embankments and canals have serious quality 
deficits - they are poorly engineered, built with 
inadequate materials, or badly maintained. The 
institutional structures often do not effectively 
handle water conflicts between sectors and the 
legal and regulatory measures are poorly enforced. 
Irrigation efficiency is critical for saving water, 
since in China almost 66% of all water is still used 
in irrigation - about 343 billion cubic meters, as 
compared to 24 billion cubic meters in urban 
areas and 89 billion cubic meters in industry (see 
Tables 8a and 8b). If estimates of experts are 
correct- that China is wasting some 30-40% of its 
irrigation water - then China's irrigated 
agriculture could save between 100 and 137 billion 
cubic meters of water. With this saving current 
Table 8 (a) Water use by economic sector in China, 1993 (billions of cubic meters) 
Agriculture 
Urban Forestry Rural 
Basin water pastures water All 
System Region Industry supply Irrigation fishery supply agriculture Total 
Northeastern 9.90 2.66 33.13 2.75 1.39 37.27 49.83 
II Hai He-Luan He Basin 6.82 3.62 27.47 1.59 1.76 30.82 41.26 
Ill Huai He Basin 6.08 2.29 39.86 4.71 3.97 48.54 56.90 
IV Huang He Basin 4.86 2.07 29.88 1.95 1.42 33.25 40.18 
v Chang Jiang Basin 40.92 7.23 101.00 7.35 7.71 116.06 164.16 
Vl Southern 13.88 4.22 48.00 2.25 4.31 54.56 72.66 
Vll Southeastern 4.61 1.36 20.21 0.97 1.75 22.93 28.89 
VIII Southwestern 0.33 0.09 4.83 0.81 0.38 6.02 6.44 
IX Interior basins 1.45 0.56 38.97 16.80 0.45 56.22 58.23 
National total 88.85 24.10 343.23 39.18 23.14 405.72 518.70 
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Table 8 (b) Water use by economic sector in China, 1993 ( % of total) 
Agriculture 
Urban Forestry Rural 
Basin water pastures water All 
System Regi,on Industry supply Irrigation fishery supply agriculture Total 
Northeastern 19.9 5.3 66.5 5.5 2.8 74.8 100.0 
II Hai He-Luan He Basin 16.5 8.8 66.6 3.9 4.3 74.7 100.0 
III Huai He Basin 10.7 4.0 70.1 8.3 7.0 85.3 100.0 
IV Huang He Basin 12.l 5.2 74.4 4.9 3.5 82.8 100.0 
v Changjiang Basin 24.9 4.4 61.5 4.5 4.7 70.7 100.0 
VI Southern 19.l 5.8 66.l 3.1 5.9 75.1 100.0 
VII Southeastern 16.0 4.7 70.0 3.4 6.1 79.4 100.0 
VIII Southwestern 5.1 1.4 75.0 12.6 5.9 93.5 100.0 
IX Interior basins 2.5 1.0 66.9 28.9 0.8 96.5 100.0 
National total 17.1 4.6 66.2 7.6 4.5 78.2 100.0 
Source: Nanjing Institute of Hydrology and Water Resources (1996): Report on the mid- and long-term plans for water demand and 
supply in China. Nanjing (cited from: UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) : Study on Assessment 
of Water Resources of Member Countries and Demand by User Sectors: China - Water Resources and Their Use ( 1997) 
urban water consumption could quadruple - at 
least. Of course, in practice, these water savings 
are unlikely, but even 10% of this amount would 
be equivalent to about half the current urban 
water consumption. These numbers show that 
investment in irrigation efficiency is a serious 
option for developing China's water resources. 
There are several simple technologies available. 
A first measure would be to invest more into the 
maintenance of irrigation canals because many 
are in poor condition or broken. Pipelines, instead 
of open canals, would largely prevent evaporation. 
However, there are also more advanced 
technologies: For instance, low-level sprinklers or 
drip irrigation might be applicable in vegetable 
and fruit cultivation. Here we cannot discuss all 
the possibilities because they very much depend 
on the specific local conditions. However, there 
can be no doubt that the saving potential is 
considerable and that technology is available to 
realize it. 
Grain import is essentially equivalent to the 
import of water. Hence, it seems that wheat 
imports could be a cost-efficient alternative to 
developing water resources in the north where 
most of the wheat is produced. Moreover, the 
import of grain would free up some of the 
cropland for the production of high-value and 
labour-intensive products, such as vegetables or 
fruit. This could certainly increase farmer's 
income and help to provide labour to the millions 
of rural un(der)employed. However, it is not so 
clear that grain imports would actually reduce 
the pressure on China's water resources, since 
the alternative production (vegetables, fruit, 
fishponds) might need even more water. 
Nevertheless, economic rationality certainly 
suggests that China should consider importing 
some 30 to 50 million tons of grain per year - in 
particular, feed grain and wheat. For example, 
Canada, France, the USA and Australia would be 
more than happy to export some of their water to 
China (in the form of grain). By the way, there is 
no reason why these countries would not be able 
to supply China with this amount of grain. The 
world grain exports from Argentina, Australia, 
Canada, the European Union and the USA have 
been stagnating at about 200 million tons annually 
since the early 1980s - not because these countries 
could not produce more, but because of a lack in 
demand, low prices and declining export 
subsidies. The European Union has been fighting 
over-production for many years - farmers are still 
being paid real money for taking fields out of 
production. 
WHAT CAN BE DONE? 
There is a great diversity of water conditions in 
China: in some places, water is abundant, in 
others, people face severe shortages. In a large 
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belt from the south-central to the northeast 
precipitation is extremely seasonal - in some years, 
all the rain falls in a few days, washing away the 
topsoil instead of soaking the soil. In the Loess 
Plateau water erodes the arable land and 
downstream, in the Yellow River basin, people 
fight the problems of siltation. In some other 
places, industry and urban discharges pollute the 
water for irrigation. In up-stream areas, farmers 
(and other users) often waste the water, while in 
the downstream provinces these rivers are 
completely dry. These specific water problems 
can only be analyzed (and solved) on a case-by-
case basis, taking into account local and regional 
conditions. 
The intention of this paper was to consider 
strategic issues at the national level that can be 
summarized in the following question: 'What are 
the key measures the Chinese Government should 
initiate to improve the water security of various 
users in the coming decades - including 
agriculture?' Based on our models and analyses, 
we believe that the following three measures are 
most important: 
First, effective pricing mechanisms for 
freshwater consumption must be implemented 
and/ or improved. Adequate water allocation 
between competing users is impossible without a 
clear price signal. All efforts to improve efficiency 
in irrigation, in the industry or in private 
households are doomed if water is considered 
essentially a free resource. Obviously, the problem 
is that poor farmers in arid regions, who need 
water for irrigation, cannot afford to pay the 
same price as rich coastal cities. Some kind of 
government regulation is, therefore, inevitable 
to protect poor segments of the population and 
economy from the booming water demand of 
rich urban areas. Various schemes to raise the 
price of water are possible, such as a water tax 
with different rates for farmers, industry and urban 
consumers. 
Second, almost everywhere in the countrywater 
technology and infrastructure must be 
modernized if China wants to avoid running into 
big problems in coming decades. In particular, 
China needs a strategic initiative to introduce 
and expand modern water supply and sewage 
systems in all its rapidly growing urban areas and 
towns. With further economic development, 
China - as any other country in the world - will 
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experience a 'sanitary revolution'. Residential 
water consumption will surge when more and 
more people are using washing machines, kitchen 
sinks, flush toilets and bathrooms in their 
apartments. Better technology is also necessary to 
clean up wastewater discharge from industry and 
mining. The biggest improvement, however, could 
be achieved with more efficient irrigation 
methods, since China still uses most of its water in 
agriculture. Many experts have estimated water 
losses of up to 60% due to evaporation and leaky 
canals. China has a sea of water in its conservation 
potential. China must also increase its efforts to 
build new reservoirs that are needed as a buffer 
against the extreme seasonality of river flow and/ 
or precipitation. Existing reservoirs have to be 
cleaned of sediment. Finally, integrated 
hydrological control schemes consisting of dams, 
reservoirs, reserved flood plains, and advanced 
monitoring and early warning systems could 
reduce the risk of flooding - one of the biggest 
threats to China's agriculture. 
Third, the trans-basin water diversion from the 
south (Yangtze) to the north and the north-central 
provinces seems to be inevitable. According to 
our detailed geobiophysical and climate 
assessment (in the AEZ model), we believe that 
China has some 20 million hectares of arable 
land reserves - in addition to its 140 million 
hectares of currently cultivated land (133 million 
hectares of cropland plus about 7 million hectares 
of horticulture). These land reserves are - in 
principle - suitable for crop cultivation according 
to their soils, terrain and temperature conditions. 
Unfortunately, about 60% of these reserves are 
located in areas where precipitation is insufficient 
(and would lead to very low yields or prevent 
cultivation altogether). However, with adequate 
and carefully managed irrigation these areas, 
which are mostly located in the north-central and 
northeast, could be used for sustainable crop 
production. There are also many currently 
cultivated areas in the northern half of the North 
China plain, which would benefit from a better 
water supply. Since pumping of groundwater is 
not a long-term alternative (the demand is higher 
than the renewable resource), water diversion 
from the water-rich south is certainly a realistic 
alternative. We know that there are very serious 
concerns with some of the massive water diversion 
projects China is currently implementing (Liu, 
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Table 9 (a) World Bank projection of China's grain demand in 2020 (milled form) 
Rice Wheat Coarse grain Total 
Per cap. consumption (kg/ person) 107.7 99.4 53.2 258.3 
Direct cereal consumption 66.5 51.5 23.l 141.1 
Manufactured food consumption 39.2 47.9 30.l 117.l 
Requirements (million tons) 208.6 174.8 224.5 607.9 
Direct and processed consumption 150.9 142.5 75.0 368.3 
Feed grains 46.3 21.6 138.2 206.l 
Seed and losses 11.5 10.7 11.3 33.5 
Source: World Bank Data and Staff Estimates. In: World Bank (1997): China 2020. At China's Table. Food Security Options. 
Washington, DC, p. 2 
This World Bank estimate projects a total grain demand of 608 million tons, which is equivalent to about 697 million tons ofun-milled 
grain 
Table 9 (b) China's food demand, 1995-2020: Various projections compared 
Brown and Halweil Rosegrant et al. Huang et al. USDA World Bank 
Pro- De- Im- Pro- De- Im- Pro-
duclion mand ports duct ion mand ports duction 
1995 355 375 20 355 375 20 355 
2000 342 405 63 385 403 18 410 
2005 329 437 108 418 434 16 438 
2010 317 472 155 453 468 15 469 
2020 294 549 255 541 565 24 552 
Source: OECD, 1997, p. 242 
1998; Barber and Ryder, 1993; CIDA, 1988; 
Fearnside, 1988; H eilig, 1998). The basic idea, 
however, is sound. Why should China not develop 
its north with water from the south - in just the 
same way as the USA have developed California 
with water from the Colorado River? Phoenix, 
Arizona - a booming city in the middle of a 
desert, was the most rapidly growing urban area 
in the USA in the last decade. China needs water 
in the north and central provinces not only for 
their agriculture - but also for the rapidly growing 
urban- industrial agglomerations such as Beijing-
Tianj in. 
CAN CIIlNA FEED ITSELF? 
Coming back to our initial question, we believe 
that China can feed itself. Most experts predict 
that within the next three decades the country 
will need - depending on diet - between 500 and 
600 million tons of grain per year (in milled 
form) for its projected population of about 1.5 
De- Im- Pro- De- Im- Pro- De- Im-
mand ports duct ion mand porls duction mand ports 
375 20 355 375 20 355 375 20 
450 40 362 387 25 411 420 9 
480 42 382 414 32 445 459 14 
513 44 403 443 40 483 502 19 
594 42 449 506 57 568 600 32 
billion (see Tables 9a and 9b). This already 
includes the necessary amount of feed grain. Based 
on our AEZ model, we have calculated that China 
has the biophysical potential under rainfed 
conditions to produce roughly 490 million tons 
of grain if 75% of all areas suitable for grain 
cultivation are used. This could be achieved with 
current technology based on agro-climatic 
conditions (soils, temperature and precipitation 
profiles, terrain). However, if irrigation would be 
available for all those areas where the water 
balance is not sufficient, China could increase its 
maximum potential production to about 690 
million tons of grain. These estimates are 
conservative, because they assume that 25% of 
suitable land will not be used for grain production, 
but for cultivation of other crops. They also 
generously deduct land for housing and 
infrastructure. 
The estimates indicate that on rain-fed 
cultivation alone China would certainly have 
problems feeding its population (only if people 
were on a strictly vegetarian diet would it perhaps 
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be possible). However, with adequate irrigation, 
China's farmers can produce enough grain for a 
1.5 billion population if we assume a (milled) 
grain demand of about 550 million tons (the 
average of available demand estimates). 
This shows that the development of a 
sustainable water supply for China's north and 
northwest is an essential factor of the country's 
food security. The numbers also indicate that 
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